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The American Influence 
on the Canadian Military, 
1939-1963 
J .L. Granatstein 
On Armistice Day in 1927, officials of the Canadian and United States governments 
dedicated a monument at Arlington Cemetery 
near Washington to commemorate the service 
of those Americans who had fought with 
Canadian forces before their country became a 
belligerent in the Great War. The occasion, 
stage-managed by Vincent Massey. Canada's 
first Minister to the United States, was a 
glittering ceremony featuring permanent force 
infantry of the Royal Canadian Regiment and 
the Royal22e Regiment in their British -pattern 
scarlet tunics, as well as the pipes and drums 
of the 48th Highlanders, a well-known kilted 
Toronto militia regiment. Everyone was on 
their best behaviour, and the occasion was a 
great success. even the review of the infantry at 
the White House by the taciturn, if not comatose, 
President Calvin Coolidge. 
So what? What made this visit by the RCRs 
and the Vandoos to Washington so noteworthy 
was that it was completely unprecedented, the 
Canadians being the first units in red coats to 
appear in the American capital since 
Washington was burned by the British (as 
retaliation for the torching of York) in 1814. 1 
The undefended border and the "century of 
peace" that followed the War of 1812 were 
already staples of after dinner speeches in both 
countries, but the military relations between 
the two countries were almost non-existent. 
Even during the Great War there had been little 
direct cooperation, other than some limited 
naval and air efforts to counter German U-
boats in North American waters and minor 
combined anti-Bolshevik operations during the 
Allied intervention in North Russia and Siberia. 
Worse still, there was some resentment in 
Canada at the long delay before the U.S. entered 
the war and the shrill American claims after 
the Armistice that the Americans had won the 
war virtually singlehanded. 
Strikingly, the military staff in both 
countries continued to plan for war against the 
other. In Ottawa. ColonelJ. Sutherland Brown, 
the Director of Military Operations and 
Intelligence at National Defence headquarters 
from 1920 to 1927, had the responsibility for 
producing war plans. His Defence Scheme 
No.1, slated to become operational in the event 
of a breakdown in relations between the U.S. 
and Britain, was based on the assumption that 
the major threat to Canada was an invasion by 
American forces. Such a threat, Brown 
maintained, could best be countered by 
launching Canadian "flying columns" at key 
points in the United States. Brown and other 
officers even undertook reconnaissance trips 
to spy out their objectives and the best routes 
toward them, and Brown himself avidly 
collected postcards showing strategic American 
locations. 2 In the U.S .. similar studies took 
form at much the same time at the Army and 
Navy War Colleges and at the War Plans 
divisions of the two services, both as training 
exercises and as contingency plans. The 
American army's "Plan Red" for war with Great 
Britain foresaw the occupation of Canada by 
four armies with the intention to "hold in 
perpetuity all . . . territories gained. . . . The 
Dominion government will be abolished." 
"Buster" Brown's scheme was cancelled in 
1931, war with the United States seeming 
utterly impossible to contemplate in Ottawa; 
the U.S. plans remained on the books until 
1937 and war college students did additional 
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studies in 1938.3 Until a few years before the 
outbreak of the Second World War, in other 
words, conflict between the North American 
nations was considered a possibility for the 
defence planners in Ottawa and Washington. 
I 
T he prospect of another world war changed everything. The threat posed by aggressive 
Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese militarists was 
all too real, one that had to be faced. Hesitantly, 
Canada and the United States began to come 
together in their own interests. The process is 
well known: President Franklin Roosevelt's 
growing concern about the defencelessness of 
the Canadian coasts and his increasing desire 
to secure naval bases in Canada and land 
access to Alaska; his regular conversations on 
defence with Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
after 1935; the first ever meetings of the 
Canadian and U.S. chiefs of staffs in January 
and November 1938 to discuss Pacific Coast 
defences; and Roosevelt's pledge at Kingston, 
Ontario in August, 1938 that the United States 
"will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian 
soil is threatened by any other empire" followed 
a few days later by a reciprocal promise from 
Mackenzie King. 4 
Canada went to war "at Britain's side" in 
September 1939 and the U.S. remained neutral. 
There was no cooperation of a military nature 
between them until the disasters of May and 
June 1940 drove France from the war and left 
Britain all but alone in the face of Hitler's Nazi 
legions. From being a minor partner in the war 
effort, Canada had suddenly become Britain's 
ranking ally. 
But Britain was desperately weak, barely 
able to defend its home islands let alone to 
protect Canada. By itself Canada could not 
have defended its territory against either a 
German attack after Britain was occupied or a 
Yanksferrying Canadian infantry in Korea, 1951 or 1952. 
(NAC PA 132638) 
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sudden Japanese raid on the Pacific coast. The 
logic of the situation was clear and Prime 
Minster Mackenzie King was quick to seize the 
opportunity when President Roosevelt invited 
him to a meeting at Ogdensburg, New York, in 
mid-August 1940. The resulting agreement, 
which included a Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence (PJBD), guaranteed Canadian security 
during the war and allowed the fullest possible 
military support to Britain; at the same time, it 
marked the establishment of a permanent 
defence relationship between the two countries 
Certainly, there was no doubt who was the 
junior in the relationship. With a population of 
just over ten million, most of its effective military 
forces in the United Kingdom and with more on 
the way there, Canada was a virtual supplicant, 
seeking the help of the 125 million-strong 
United States to defend its homeland in a world 
suddenly made unaccustomedly perilous. 
There was every sign ofthis in the negotiations 
over a strategic defence plan for the continent 
when the Americans proved to be as difficult to 
deal with as the British had ever been. The 
HMCS Nootka being resupplied by USS Virgo off the Korean coast. Ice cream, steaks, ammo, etc. 
and the real beginnings ofthe close and complex 
military links that persist to the present. The 
United States had definitively replaced the 
United Kingdom as Canada's senior defence 
partner. 5 
(NAC PA 125625) 
U.S. generals' demands for unity of command 
seemed to translate into complete 
administrative and operational control over all 
Canadian forces involved in the defence of 
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North America, an aim that was partly defeated 
and only with enormous difficulty. 6 
Washington, for its part, resisted Canada's 
efforts to establish a military mission in the 
U.S. capital,? and when it sent troops into 
Canada in 1942 to build a highway to Alaska, 
they sometimes acted more as an army of 
occupation than as allies. 8 There were also 
serious difficulties in working out command 
relationships with the American services 
operating in Newfoundland.9 
Still, the wartime cooperation with the 
United States was generally good. Some 8,864 
Americans served in the Royal Canadian Air 
Force during the war, and more than five 
thousand continued their service after the 
United States entered the war in December 
1941. 10 RCAF squadrons participated in the 
defence of Alaska and Canadian Army troops 
shared in the re-conquest of the Aleutian 
Islands.U A combined Canadian-American 
unit, the First Special Service Force, saw action 
in the Aleutians, Italy and France, 12 and 
American army divisions served under 
command of First Canadian Army at various 
points during the campaign in Northwest 
Europe in 1944-45. Canadaalsohadadivision 
prepared for service in the invasion of Japan, 
one that was to be organized on American lines 
and equipped with U.S. weapons. Why? As 
General A.G.L. McNaughton, the Defence 
Minster at the time and always a cautious man 
in dealing with the Yanks, said, "One of the 
primary reasons . . . was to obtain experience 
with the United States system of Army 
organization and U.S. equipment in view of the 
obvious necessity for the future to co-ordinate 
the defence of North America .... "13 As that 
suggested, post-hostilities planners in Ottawa 
clearly foresaw the increasing tension between 
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., understanding that 
this obliged Canada to carefully consider its 
role in the defence of the continent. 14 
The events of the war had marked a historic 
change in Canada's place in the world. 
Curiously, however, there was as yet little sign 
of this in the attitudes, equipment, and training 
ofthe Canadian forces. The direct influence of 
the American military on their Canadian 
counterparts was still relatively limited. The 
66 
methods and models for Canadian soldiers, 
sailors and airmen without question remained 
British in 1945. 
II 
Britain's military weakness in 1940 had pushed Canada into its first defence 
alliance with the United States. The Mother 
Country would never recover its military power 
in a postwar world that had room for only two 
superpowers with their global reach and 
massive nuclear arsenals. Ideological 
similarities and geography both made certain 
that Canada's policy generally moved in tandem 
with that of its neighbour, and the military 
marched to a different beat in the postwar 
years. In North America, the Military 
Cooperation Committee, a joint planning body 
spun off from the Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence, began the process of integrating 
continental defences in the spring of 1946. 15 
The Canadian military planners worried about 
their cousins' practices and occasionally 
alarmist assessments. General Guy Simonds, 
arguably the most successful Canadian wartime 
commander, complained in 194 7 that the 
American "military authorities made plans 
based entirely on potential enemy capabilities, 
whereas it was the practice in Canada to take 
into consideration not only capabilities but 
probabilities."16 Officers like Simonds tried to 
maintain the filial links with the British forces 
(Simonds even created a Regular Force regiment 
of Canadian Guards when he was Chief of the 
General Staff a few years later), but it was 
increasingly a vain struggle as the Cold War 
wore on and American power increased. 17 
Signs ofthis began to be evident in the joint 
Canadian-U.S. training exercises that began 
in the late 1940s and even more so during the 
Korean War, the first major armed struggle of 
an ideologically driven era. 18 The 25th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade served as part of the 
Commonwealth Division in Korea for purely 
practical reasons. In 1950, even though the 
government had already made the decision to 
switch to American-pattern equipment, the 
Canadian equipment in use was still primarily 
British (steel helmets, battle dress, 25-pounder 
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Post-Kiska: Canadians in U.S. unifonns in Alaska. 
(painting by E.J. Hughes, National Gallery of Canada No.l2956) 
guns and .303 Lee-Enfield rifles, for example). 
The use of U.S. equipment. the Chief of the 
General Staff noted, would have required "major 
changes in ... minor tactical doctrine." 19 
Moreover, the inherited dogma was that 
American battlefield doctrine was, as befitted a 
country with a huge population, wasteful of 
lives and treasure; like Britain, Canada had 
few of its sons to spare. Brooke Claxton, the 
Minster of National Defence, shared this 
received wisdom. After a visit to Korea, where 
he returned unimpressed with the American 
commanders and appalled by the "lying" of 
staff officers who gave the briefings, he wrote a 
friend that "American expenditures of lives 
and ammunition are high according to our 
standards, higher than our people would be 
willing to accept. "20 
The Royal Canadian Navy was equally 
critical of its American cousins. In his memoirs, 
Admiral Jeffry Brock recalled that the fleet 
signal book employed by the RCN had one code 
for going into action: "Enemy in Sight. Am 
Engagin." The comparable USN code translated 
as "Request Permission to Open Fire on the 
Enemy," something that Brock was convinced 
was part and parcel "of the determined 
67 
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resistance of American officers to make any 
move at all without the written and signed 
authorization of someone senior."21 Even so, 
there was a pressing need "to share the United 
States Navy's technical know-how, especially 
in anti-submarine warfare weaponry." As one 
commentator noted, "The coming change was 
first detected in the new terminology"-the 
British term "asdic" was superseded by the 
American word "sonar."22 The establishment 
of NATO's Supreme Allied Command Atlantic 
(SACLANT). with headquarters at Norfolk, Va., 
also meant that the RCN now had its place with 
the USN and not the Royal Navy. 23 
Moreover, in Korea the Canadians had 
learned that not everything about the U.S. 
forces was bad. Brigadier John Rockingham, 
the first commander of the 25th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, paid a courtesy call on General 
Horace Robertson, the Australian officer serving 
in Japan as Commander-in-Chief 
Commonwealth forces. Robertson wanted the 
Canadians to use Australian rations "as this 
would be to Australia's financial advantage." 
Rockingham flatly refused: "I explained that 
my cooks had been trained to cook American 
rations and my soldiers had become used to 
them and liked them very much. "24 The RCN. 
operating three destroyers in Korean waters, 
found much the same thing. "The 
Commonwealth base at Kure [Japan] ... had 
the right kinds of ammunition and machinery 
spares for the Canadian ships," Commander 
Tony German wrote. "but ... British provisions 
were terrible. Canadian ration scales were 
S/LAndrew Mackenzie flying USAF Sabres in Korea. He was shot down (by a U.S.jet) and taken prisoner. 
(PL 52195) 
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much better than RN now, but in Kure [Japan] 
they mainly got tough mutton .... From the 
Americans in Sasebo there was first-rate 
beef.... ice cream, milk, fresh fruit and 
vegetables and such magic as frozen French 
fries .... "25 Armies (and navies too) march on 
their stomachs and, whenever they could be 
secured, the Canadians now simply refused to 
march without American rations. 
American equipment too was increasingly 
coveted. Sometimes this was because U.S. 
equipment was both more comfortable to wear, 
better designed for protection, and simply more 
effective than the Second World War-pattern 
British material used by the Canadian forces. 
For example, the steel helmet used in World 
War II and Korea by British and Canadian 
forces offered no cover for the back of the neck, 
weighed a ton, and was so awkward that it was 
almost impossible to run while wearing it. "The 
less said about the present helmet the better," 
wrote one infantry battalion commander. The 
American helmet, by contrast, offered better 
protection and, because it had a liner that was 
removable, could even be used for cooking over 
an open fire in a pinch. No Canadian wept 
when the U.K. helmet was scrapped in the late-
1950s. Even the Americans' mess tins, eating 
utensils and cup were better designed than the 
comparable Canadian equipment issued to 
soldiers in the field. 26 
This desire for American equipment was 
especially evident at the expensive end-aircraft 
and missiles. The sky-high costs of developing 
technologically sophisticated weapons systems 
were driving smaller nations out of the market. 
Canada's experience with the Avro Arrow fighter 
aircraft is too well known to need comment, 27 
but even larger powers like Britain were having 
their problems in paying the bills. For the U.K. 
that meant abandoning efforts to develop 
missile systems of its own. For Canada, the 
logic of the calculus of expenditures was equally 
clear. As General Charles Foulkes, the powerful 
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 
told the Minister of National Defence in 1958, 
"It appears apparent that we are reaching a 
stage in Canada where it will not be possible for 
us to develop and produce further complicated 
weapons purely for Canadian use .... " That 
meant, he said, that "the defence of North 
America will have to depend upon the joint 
development and production of these weapons 
and weapon systems for our joint use."28 
In fact, even that was a hope, certainly not 
a certainty. The best Canada could expect was 
to purchase American air-to-air missiles, 
Bomarc surface-to-air missiles and aircraft 
liketheCF-101 Voodoo, theCF-104Starfighter, 
the CF -5 Freedom Fighter, the CP-140 Aurora, 
the Boeing 707 and others under schemes that 
often saw parts built in Canada or offsets for 
Canadian industry included in the deal. 
American equipment was not always the very 
best available, but it was invariably close to it. 
Moreover, in contrast to the increasingly 
impecunious Canadian and British armed 
services, the United States military had the 
goods of modern warfare in lavish profusion, 29 
and the officers and men of the Canadian 
Forces inevitably and understandably wanted 
their small share of it. In effect, this equipment 
envy, this military amour-propre, was often a 
driving force for policy. 
No where was this more true than in the 
Royal Canadian Air Force. Even before the 
NORAD agreement formally integrated the air 
defence systems of the U.S. and Canada in 
1957, the RCAFwas already tightly linked with 
the USAF on both a personal and a professional 
level. 30 "The two air forces," Joseph Jackel 
wrote of the early 1950s, 
came to see the air defence of North America more 
and more as a problem to be tackled jointly with 
resources that were becoming more and more 
intertwined. Direct and permanent links were forged 
between the two air defence commands, by-passing 
the more formal channels of communication .... 31 
He added that the 
two air forces had every reason to cooperate. They 
were faced with a common military threat. As airmen, 
they shared an outlook which created a similar 
identity and even an emotional bond. They were 
interested in convincing civilians of the danger to the 
continent. Both . . . were locked in struggles with 
their sister services for defence funds. Finally, for 
the RCAF, the USAF was a source of funding for radar 
stations and a source of pressure on Ottawa to 
recognize the importance of air defence. 32 
69 
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Leonard Johnson, who retired as a major-
general, put it more succinctly: "The U.S. Air 
Force was a big and powerful cousin with 
whom we identified. "33 Moreover, until the 
early 1970s in NATO, Canadian airmen served 
with the Americans, unlike the army brigade 
which operated in the British sector of West 
Germany. 34 And because the Canadian aviation 
industry (even after the cancellation of the 
Arrow) was relatively well developed, much 
more so than was necessary to support 
Canada's relatively small air force needs, export 
sales to the United States were essential. That 
gave the airmen a community of interest with 
the industry and both an effective joint lobby 
with the government. 35 The result from the 
early 1950s onwards was that the RCAF 
received the lion's share of the defence budget 
and the greatest influence on defence policy-
making.36 
This became especially apparent when the 
Conservative government of John Diefenbaker 
decided in 1959 to arm the Canadian Forces 
with nuclear weapons. The RCAF would have 
nuclear missiles for its aircraft flying in defence 
of Canada, a nuclear ground attack role for its 
CF -1 04s serving in NATO, and nuclear-armed 
Bomarc missiles at two bases in Ontario and 
Quebec. By 1960, however, the government 
began to waver in its commitment to nuclear 
weapons and, some might say, in its support 
for Canada's alliances. One obvious sign of 
this came during the Cuban missile crisis of 
1962 when Diefenbaker resisted the entreaties 
of his Defence minister and delayed putting 
Canada's NORAD aircraft on alert. The 
Americans were justifiably furious, but in fact 
the aircraft had been surreptitiously prepared 
for war, the Defence Minister informally 
authorizing the action, and every fighter aircraft 
being armed and put on readiness.37 
The RCAF was not alone in going to war 
readiness. The Royal Canadian Navy cancelled 
leaves and put every ship it had (in 1962, it had 
some!) to sea, relieving the United States Navy 
of responsibility for a critical sector of the 
Western Atlantic. One authoritative account 
summarized the reasoning of Admiral Kenneth 
Dyer, in command on the East coast: "North 
America was under direct immediate threat. 
That included Canada. All the long-standing 
70 
arrangements and government-to-government 
agreements said if one partner boosted its 
defence [readiness] condition, the other 
followed." When Ottawa did nothing, Dyer 
simply acted. His relationship with his U.S. 
NATO commanders at SACLANT had been 
formed over the years in countless NATO 
exercises and was so close and so trusting, his 
assessment of the Soviet threat so fearful, that 
he felt obliged to put to sea to assist his ally. 
"That "band of brothers," Nelson's basic way of 
running things at sea, by mutual understanding 
and a firm grasp of the basic aim," Commander 
Tony German wrote, "was alive and well in 
North America in 1962. The navy ... honoured 
Canada's duty to stand by her North American 
ally. . . . "38 Even if the Prime Minister had 
wished otherwise. 
This same attitude, this putting of the 
service's assessment of the threat and its 
particular needs ahead of government policy, 
was even more apparent in the next few months. 
Badly battered by its ineptitude during the 
Cuban crisis, the government was now about 
to be brought down by its anti-Americanism 
and its reluctance to arm the Bomarc missiles 
it had secured with the nuclear warheads they 
needed to become effective. A key player in the 
process was Wing Commander Bill Lee, the 
head of RCAF public relations in Ottawa. Lee 
had graduated at the top of his class from the 
USAF Public Relations School ("renowned as 
one of the leading institutions in its field," Paul 
Hellyer, Defence Minister after 1963, wrote).39 
Now Lee, other RCAF officers, and USAF senior 
officers worked together to lobby the media 
against the Diefenbaker policy and in favour of 
nuclear weapons. As Lee admitted later, "It 
was a flat-out campaign, because Diefenbaker 
was not living up to his commitments. Roy 
Sleman [Canadian Deputy Commander of 
NORAD] was going bananas down in Colorado 
Springs. We identified key journalists, business 
and labour people, and key Tory hitters in 
Toronto, and some Liberals, too, and flew them 
out to NORAD. It was very effective." So it was, 
as the American view of the defence needs of 
the North American continent was put forcefully 
and clearly to key Canadian opinion makers, 
not least by Air Marshal Sleman and Wing 
Commander Lee. Significantly, Lee's campaign 
had the full support of his superiors, he says, 
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the Air Council having authorized it, and the 
Chief of the Air Staff having secured the 
permission of the Chairman of the Chiefs of 
StaffCommittee,AirChiefMarshalFrankMiller. 
"You go ahead," Lee quotes Miller. "Just don't 
tell me the details. "40 The campaign worked, 
undoubtedly helped mightily by Diefenbaker's 
incompetence. In February 1963 the 
government was defeated in Parliament over 
its nuclear policy. 41 Within a few months, the 
incoming Liberal government had accepted the 
nuclear weaponry. 
The significance of this affair and the Cuban 
missile crisis ought to be clear. The military in 
Canada in the past had occasionally disagreed 
with government policy and made known its 
feelings to the media. That was certainly true 
during the conscription crisis of 1944, to cite 
only one example. But these issues in 1962 
and 1963 were different, directly involving as 
they did the policies of a foreign government 
and its armed services. Whether the actions of 
John Diefenbaker were malign, stupid, or 
simply wrong-headed, his administration had 
been duly and properly elected and was entitled 
to expect the armed forces to put the Canadian 
government's policy interests ahead of those of 
the United States. The military's defence 
undoubtedly would be that they were doing 
just that. But in fact, over the years, what had 
happened was that the formal and informal 
links between the Canadian and American 
military-the transgovernmental relations, as 
political scientists call them-had grown so 
close that the senior officers placed their service 
interests and their assessment of the situation 
ahead oftheir government's. As Jocelyn Ghent 
put it, "the Canadian military perceived and 
acted on a threat that was defined not by their 
government, but by the transgovernmental 
group to which they felt much closer, the 
Canadian-American military. "42 
Probably this had been inevitable. No 
small country living cheek-by-jowl with a 
superpower could expect to retain full military 
independence and especially not if it were 
entwined in defence, economic, and political 
alliances to the extent Canada and the U.S. 
were. Still, the impropriety of these actions is 
evident, and their effect on civil-military 
relations in Canada has never been confronted 
or even acknowledged by the political 
leadership. So far as is known, no attempt was 
ever made to impede or reverse the 
entrenchment of the transgovernmental 
linkages that pushed Canadian policy far ahead 
of the government's wishes in 1962 or that 
helped to bring down a government in 1963; no 
serious or sustained effort was made to reverse 
or even check the Americanization of the armed 
forces. Indeed, the process of unification, 
launched by Defence Minister Paul Hellyer in 
the mid-1960s with the intention, among other 
things, of giving Canada distinctive military 
forces, may have speeded the trend by dealing 
a killing blow to the Army's system of corps and 
its distinctive and much loved uniforms, 
buttons and badges. The army had been the 
least Americanized of the forces before the 
mid-1960s,43 proud ofits regiments and their 
traditions. The dark green uniform that came 
with unification homogenized the Canadian 
military and weakened the land forces' 
psychological defences against Ameri-
canization. The budget cuts of the Trudeau 
and Mulroney years and the sometimes slavish 
adherence of the latter government to 
Washington's policy have effectively completed 
the process. If Quebec becomes independent 
in the 1990s and if the Canadian Forces in 
consequence abandon their bilingualism, there 
will be very little remaining other than Canada's 
self-professed expertise in United Nations 
peacekeeping to differentiate the military forces 
of the two countries. 
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